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Abstract 
Objectives: To describe serious incidents occurring in the management of patient remains 
after their death. 
Design: Incidents occurring after patient death were analysed using content analysis to 
determine what happened, why it happened and the outcome.  
Setting: The STEIS database of serious incidents requiring investigation occurring in the 
National Health Service in England.  
Participants: All cases describing an incident that occurred following death, regardless of the 
age of the patient. 
Main outcome measures: The nature of the incident, the underlying cause or causes of the 
incident and the outcome of the incident.  
Results: 132 incidents were analysed, these related to the storage, management or disposal of 
deceased patient remains. 54 incidents concerned problems with the storage of bodies or 
body parts. 43 incidents concerned problems with the management of bodies, including 25 
errors in post mortem examination, or post mortems on the wrong body. 31 incidents related 
to the disposal of bodies, 25 bodies were released from the mortuary to undertakers in error, 
of these nine were buried or cremated by the wrong family. The reported underlying causes 
were similar to those known to be associated with safety incidents occurring before death and 
 3 
included weaknesses in or failures to follow protocol and procedure, poor communication, and 
informal working practices. 
Conclusions: Serious incidents in the management of deceased patient remains have 
significant implications for families, hospitals and the health service more broadly. Safe 
mortuary care may be improved by applying lessons learned from existing patient safety work. 
Key words 
Patient safety, deceased, death, mortuary, post mortem, errors, incident.  
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Introduction 
Hospitals have a clear responsibility to ensure the safety of the patients that they care for [1] 
and this duty of care continues even after death [2,3]. Strictly speaking, a dead person cannot 
be harmed but civilised society expects that, afteƌ death, soŵeoŶe’s ďody ǁill ďe aĐĐorded the 
same dignity and respect as during life. In the United Kingdom, the societal mores that guide 
such expectations have led to public anger when it was judged that healthcare institutions 
have failed to respect the dead. Prominent examples of this are the removal and retention of 
ĐhildƌeŶ’s oƌgaŶs at Aldeƌ Hey Hospital in Liverpool, keeping patieŶts’ brains in Manchester, 
and the storage of bodies on the floor of a hospital chapel in Bedford [4-6]. Indeed, 
mistreatment of bodies has been given media coverage equal to, or greater than, harm before 
death in some instances [7,8]. When discovered these events have led to extensive enquiries 
and even changes to the law [2,4-5,9]. 
Patient safety research studies have demonstrated that the burden of harm caused by unsafe 
care is substantial [10-11]. Much work has been done in the field of healthcare to improve 
patient safety, including attempts to learn from reports of safety incidents to re-engineer and 
improve systems [12]. The prevention of incidents following death has, by contrast, received 
little or no attention in the scientific literature. We could find no published systematic study of 
errors following death, their impact, underlying causes and potential remedies.  
We used a large national database of serious incidents to identify those that occurred after the 
death of a patient and determine what happened, underlying causes and the outcomes, using 
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the WHO International Classification for Patient Safety (WHO ICPS) [13] to provide a 
conceptual framework, as has been used previously in both primary and secondary level care 
to characterise safety incidents [14-15].  
Methods 
Since 2002, hospitals and other NHS organisations in England have been required to record, 
report and investigate any serious incident requiring investigation (SIRI). These are defined as: 
͞unexpected or avoidable death of patients, staff, visitors or members of the public; serious 
harm to patients, staff, visitors or members of the public; a scenario that prevents or threatens 
to pƌeǀeŶt a pƌoǀideƌ oƌgaŶisatioŶ’s aďility to ĐoŶtiŶue to deliver healthcare services; 
allegations of abuse; and adverse media coverage or public concern about the organisation or 
the wider NHS͟ [16]. 
The resulting database, the Strategic Executive Information System (STEIS), is the source of our 
study population. It had accumulated over 120,000 reports of serious incidents by April 2014. 
The system is separate from the more widely researched National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS). The latter database records incidents of lower degrees of harm (as well as 
serious harm) and is therefore a larger repository of incidents. It has been extensively used to 
study the nature of harm reported from front-line patient care [14, 17-18]. The STEIS system 
has the advantage that reporting of serious incidents is a requirement placed on all providers 
of NHS care by NHS headquarters. Also, the reporting organisation is required to formally 
investigate, account for what happened, and set out action taken as a result. 
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Each recorded incident contains categorical information and free-text commentary. The 
categorical information (some captured through drop-down menus) covers: administrative 
data, the care sector and clinical area involved, the location of the incident, basic demographic 
data of the patient involved and the type of incident. Free text fields completed at the time of 
initially reporting the incident record information on what occurred, what immediate action 
was taken and a summary of the case. The reporting organisation is later required to complete 
further free-text fields detailing the investigation carried out, root causes identified and 
lessons learned following the incident.  
We interrogated the database in October 2014. The process by which reports are compiled in 
STEIS means that it can be many months, often over a year, before the full details of an 
incident are available. To ensure completeness of reports analysed, the period studied 
included incidents occurring between 1st April 2002 and 31st March 2013. Incident reports 
where the field location of incident ǁas eŶteƌed as ͞Moƌtuaƌy͟, the field clinical area was 
eŶteƌed as ͞Histopathology͟ oƌ ͞GeŶeƌal pathology͟ aŶd/or the field incident type was entered 
as ͞Post ŵoƌteŵ͟ were extracted and the full reports independently scrutinised by two 
authors to ensure they met the following inclusion and exclusion criteria: Only incidents 
involving bodies or body parts (regardless of age or completed gestation) were included. 
Incidents not relating to a deceased patient or involving events prior to death were excluded.  
The categorical data were used to provide contextual variables whilst the free-text information 
within the incident report was subjected to content analysis. Content analysis [19] was used to 
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deconstruct the narrative content included in reports into a series of codes which represent 
and retain the meaning of the report in order to identify, for each incident, three major 
concepts from WHO ICPS: the type of incident (what happened); contributory factors (the 
circumstances, actions or influences that led to the incident); and the outcome. An inductive 
approach was taken whereby all reports were repeatedly read and re-read to familiarise the 
researchers with the data. During this familiarisation process, open coding was performed and 
themes present in the data noted. These themes were then collated into a coding framework 
that was applied to all reports.  New codes were added in an iterative manner and the new 
framework reapplied to previous cases to ensure the consistency and completeness of the 
analysis. At the conclusion of the analysis each report was allocated a single code to describe 
the type of incident, and either none, one or multiple contributory factors. Reports were 
grouped by outcome and re-read to identify themes common to these groups and potential 
learning opportunities from the incidents reported. 
The need for ethical approval was waivered ďy the Caƌdiff UŶiǀeƌsity “Đhool of MediĐiŶe’s 
Research Ethics Committee (SMREC Ref 16/59).   
 
Results 
The initial search criteria returned 391 cases. Of these 217 were excluded as they did not 
relate to incidents involving a deceased patient. A further 42 were excluded because they 
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desĐƌiďed aŶ iŶĐideŶt that oĐĐuƌƌed pƌioƌ to the patieŶt’s death. This left a total of 132 
incidents meeting the inclusion criteria. These occurred evenly throughout the period study. 
The outcome of these incidents fell into three broad groups relating to:  Storage, 
Management, or Disposal of bodies and body parts as shown in Table 1. [insert Table 1] Three 
incidents were reported that led to no harm and so could not be coded with an outcome. 
These included two refrigeration failures where action was taken before decomposition and 
one incident where the wrong patient details were allocated to a body but this was quickly 
corrected. A further incident report of thefts from bodies did not fit into any of the categories. 
 
OUTCOME OF THE INCIDENTS 
Storage 
Incidents were grouped under the theme ͞“toƌage͟ ǁheƌe they involved a failure to look after 
remains in the custody of the mortuary. This included physical damage to bodies and failures 
to monitor storage leading to the loss, or inadvertent retention, of bodies or body parts.  
Disfiguring of bodies was the adverse outcome described in 24 incident reports. For example:  
͞PatieŶt's ďody ǁas Ŷot ƌefƌigeƌated oǀeƌ ǁeekeŶd ƌeŶdeƌiŶg ďody uŶsuitaďle foƌ 
ǀieǁiŶg ďy ƌelatiǀes͟  
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Decomposition resulting from storing bodies for too long or at too high a temperature was the 
commonest reported cause, occurring in 15 incidents. In two, the bodies decomposed before 
post-mortem examination (PM), and in the third, the coroner ordered a second PM that could 
not be undertaken due to the state of the body. The other cases of decomposition caused 
distress to bereaved relatives; they were either unable to view the body or saw it in a 
mutilated state. Seven reports described bodies that were disfigured due to being accidentally 
dropped or struck whilst being moved around the mortuary. Two reports of disfigurement 
were caused by hypostasis from incorrect storage. 
Ten incident reports concerned bodies wrongly kept in the mortuary for longer than intended. 
These were mainly foetuses but two were adults with no known next of kin. Where there was 
a family connected to the body, they were unaware that their relative’s remains were still in 
the mortuary. This was because the family had received and disposed of what they understood 
were the complete remains but were later told there was further tissue (for example the 
placenta being released instead of the body in the case of neonatal deaths).  
In all, 13 incident reports involved retained tissue. The incidents then necessitated contacting 
families and releasing further body parts. None of the incident reports suggested that the 
retention of tissue had been intentional. All had occurred due to separation of the organs or 
tissue from the rest of the body for storage and then a failure to reunite these at the point of 
disposal.  
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Management 
Incidents were grouped under the theme ͞MaŶageŵeŶt͟ where the required actions to be 
undertaken on a body were either not carried out or carried out in a substandard manner. 
In 25 cases, the incident occurred during PM. For example: 
͞[A PM ǁas ĐoŵŵeŶĐed] It ǁas ƋuiĐkly ƌeĐogŶized that the eaƌly findings were not 
compatible with the history. The identity of the body was re-checked and it was then 
apparent that the body had been misidentified and removed from the refrigerator in 
eƌƌoƌ.͟  
In 13 cases, the PM was performed on the wrong patient due to mis-identification. In a further 
nine cases, the PM was carried out either without consent or beyond the limits of the consent 
given.  
Four incidents related to the donation of organs or bodies following death. One patient wished 
to donate corneas and two patients intended to donate their whole bodies to medical science 
but this was not possible due to mismanagement of their bodies. In the fourth case, corneas 
were harvested from the wrong body. 
 
Disposal 
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Incidents were grouped under the theme ͞Disposal͟ ǁhere the outcome involved the way that 
the body left the mortuary. In 25 cases, the wrong body was released to the undertaker and in 
nine of them the body was cremated or buried, necessitating exhumation and a further 
funeral. For two families, the mistake was discovered when they were shown the wrong body 
at the funeral director’s premises. A further two bodies were embalmed but not viewed before 
rectification. In the remaining 12 cases, the mistake was noticed before either viewing or a 
funeral and the deceased was exchanged for the correct body.  
The mortuary disposed of six bodies incorrectly.  All were foetuses ǁheƌe the paƌeŶts’ 
requested means of disposal was not carried out. This was either cremation rather than burial 
or vice versa, or that the remains were disposed of without the parents being made aware, 
preventing them from attending. 
 
Reaction of relatives 
Although not coded as an outcome of incidents, 74 of the reports referred to the reaction of 
the next of kin to these adverse outcomes. Commonly used descriptions were ͞eŵotioŶal 
upset,͟ aŶd ͞deǀastated͟. In almost all incidents reports the hospital authorities were 
recorded as having informed the family of the deceased of the incident. In the remaining few 
reports it was not clear if the family were informed. 
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CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES 
An overview of the reported contributory factors in all reports is shown in Table 2.  
[insert Table 2] 
Misidentification  
As might be expected, the commonest contributory factor (n=50) was failure to follow 
standard identification procedures. In these incidents, the reports stated that a protocol for 
identification of bodies was in place but it had not been followed. For example: 
͞It was common practice for one member of staff to check the paperwork and one to 
check the patient, and at no time did either check the other as per instructions in the 
pƌotoĐol. Both deĐeased had Ŷaŵes iŶ ĐoŵŵoŶ͟  
In 12 of the 50 cases of misidentification, the body in question had the same or similar name to 
another being held in the mortuary.  Each mortuary had a procedure for highlighting same-
name bodies, but this relied on an individual recognising the similarity and highlighting the 
issue rather than the danger being flagged automatically. 
In 25 reports, absent or inadequate standard operating procedures (SOPs) or protocols were 
described. For example:  
͞The ƌoot Đause ǁas ideŶtified as aŶ aďseŶĐe of a ƌoďust systeŵ to eŶsuƌe that 
ĐoŶseŶt foƌŵs aƌe ĐheĐked thoƌoughly at the staƌt of eaĐh PM iŶǀestigatioŶ͟  
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These shortcomings resulted in PMs not being carried out, bodies being retained for prolonged 
periods and bodies being disposed of incorrectly. Weak identification protocols were 
mentioned in several reports, including those only requiring one member of staff to check a 
ďody’s ideŶtity, oƌ ƌelyiŶg oŶ just oŶe patieŶt ideŶtifieƌ ;usually theiƌ ŶaŵeͿ iŶstead of the tǁo 
or three (name plus date of birth and hospital number or address) that is standard in clinical 
practice. Other descriptions in incident reports of absent standard operating procedures 
included: a lack of instructions to staff on actions to be taken on discovering refrigerator 
failure out-of-hours; rules for allowing viewings of a body; and process to be adopted when an 
obese body will not fit in the refrigerator.  
Failures in cataloguing mortuary content were described in 40 reports. This was most 
commonly a failure to link bodies with body parts that were stored separately. This led either 
to the body being released whilst organs were retained inappropriately or only body parts 
being released, whilst the body remained in the mortuary. Other failures of cataloguing 
procedures caused processing delays with bodies retained for unacceptable periods of time. 
Infrastructure failure 
Infrastructure failures were responsible for 17 incidents, 14 of which involved refrigerator 
malfunction. In three, there was no adverse outcome as alarm systems were triggered and 
remedial action taken. The other 11 led to decomposition of bodies.  The remaining three 
infrastructure failures were of equipment used to move bodies, causing damage to the body.  
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Mis-communication 
Twenty-six incidents were underlain by failures in communication between the mortuary and 
other departments. Handover between the maternity department and the mortuary for foetal 
remains was the inter-departmental relationship mentioned most frequently. One report 
noted that 12 possibilities were routinely considered when deciding on the handling of the 
foetus following intra-uterine death, depending on gestational age and parental choices. 
Failure in the communication of these options and the lack of a standard operating procedure 
for hand-overs between the two departments contributed to all seven cases of incorrect 
disposal of remains. Errors in communication with the coroner contributed to a further seven 
cases, leading to post-mortem examinations being carried out incorrectly. 
Poor written documentation was an element of causation in 15 incidents. This included 
consent for post-mortem examinations or disposal being incomplete or filed incorrectly, 
findings of post-mortem examinations being recorded inaccurately or late and decisions or 
information arrived at during telephone conversations with other departments (including the 
CoƌoŶeƌ’s OffiĐeͿ not being recorded. These underlying factors resulted in post mortems not 
being carried or being undertaken without consent.  
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Misconduct of staff was the direct cause of seven confidentiality incidents where hospital 
workers accessed bodies in an inappropriate and unauthorised manner. There was also an 
isolated case of theft from bodies by mortuary staff.  
The negative influence of informal working practices within the mortuary was evident in 11 
reports. For example:  
͞The uŶdeƌtakeƌ should haǀe ďeeŶ aĐĐoŵpaŶied aŶd supeƌǀised at all tiŵes ďy the 
ŵoƌtuaƌy teĐhŶiĐiaŶ ǁhilst iŶ the ŵoƌtuaƌy…. IŶ this iŶstaŶĐe, hoǁeǀeƌ, the 
undertaker was allowed to locate the body he had Đoŵe to ĐolleĐt uŶaĐĐoŵpaŶied͟  
This most often concerned interactions with funeral directors. Reports commonly described 
mortuaries: allowing funeral directors unsupervised access to body stores; having no 
appointment or queuing system for collections; dealing with more than one collection at a 
time; overlooking omissions or discrepancies in the paperwork required to collect bodies. Such 
informality contributed to identification errors, leading to incidents where the wrong body was 
released.  
Patient characteristics 
Patient remains at either end of the extreme of body size was found to be a contributory cause 
of several storage incidents. In four incidents, obesity contributed to adverse outcomes. As the 
bodies did not fit into standard refrigerators they were left outside a temperature-controlled 
environment contributing to both decomposition and misidentification in communal areas. 
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Conversely, physically small foetal remains lent themselves to storage in communal areas 
leading to them being over looked and retained incorrectly.  
 
Discussion 
Serious incidents involving a dead body are uncommon.  We found a reported rate of less than 
one per month although the true frequency may be higher because some degree of under-
reporting is likely. However, such occurrences harm families, lead to loss of clinical and 
forensic information, and can damage trust in healthcare organisations. Some high-profile 
healthcare incidents involving the living, for example wrong site surgery, are also uncommon 
but considered unacceptable [20]. Just as wrong site surgery should never be acceptable, so 
the release of the wrong body to an undertaker should be unacceptable.  
We believe that our study is the first to systematically examine serious incidents of this nature. 
The ability to access a national database of serious incidents, governed by mandatory 
reporting, has enabled an analysis that goes beyond case reports of isolated instances and 
explores underlying patterns of error. There is the possibility that the mortuaries in which the 
incident reports included in our study arose from are unrepresentative of mortuaries in 
general and are only the extreme end of poor practice. However, the consistency of the types 
of incidents and the contributing factors underlying them is conspicuous.  
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We found a systemic pattern of error that transcended individual localities. These involved the 
management of bodies, both across the period of the study and between organisations. 
Misidentification of bodies, and failures to catalogue and monitor the contents of mortuaries, 
repeatedly led to the retention or loss of human remains and the wrong bodies undergoing 
post-mortem examination, being buried, or being cremated. Nearly a quarter of all reported 
incidents in our study involved foetuses. This remains a deeply sensitive and contentious area 
that is a rigorous test of the quality of patient-centred care. A hospital board and its senior 
executives cannot promote their values in this regard if they fail parents by presiding over 
incidents in the management of the bodies of their precious children. The handling of such 
cases is complex because of the statutory elements governing procedures, and the importance 
of observing the wishes of the parents. It is true that the small size of the foetuses leads to 
them often being stored in communal clinical and mortuary areas, predisposing to 
misidentification. However, this is the very reason that a very high standard of procedure is 
needed. 
What is striking in this study of a novel field of healthcare risk is how the findings resembled 
those incidents occurring before death. ͞PatieŶt aĐĐideŶt͟, ͞DoĐuŵeŶtatioŶ ;iŶĐludiŶg 
ideŶtifiĐatioŶͿ͟, ͞IŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe͟, ͞CoŶseŶt, ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aŶd ĐoŶfideŶtiality͟ aŶd 
͞TƌeatŵeŶt, pƌoĐeduƌe͟ aƌe all iŶĐluded iŶ the teŶ ŵost fƌeƋueŶt iŶĐideŶt types ƌepoƌted to 
the NHS [21]. If disfigured oƌ deĐoŵposiŶg ďodies aƌe ĐoŶsideƌed aŶalogous ǁith ͞patieŶt 
accident,͟ aŶd post-mortem examination is equivalent to a ͞pƌoĐeduƌe,͟ theŶ these fiǀe 
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incident types account for well over half of the incidents included in our study. We also found 
similarities in causal factors. Poor communication is a well-known hazard in clinical care, 
particularly at points of handover between providers [22-23]. We found problems in 
interdepartmental working were a key factor in many of the incidents in our study, particularly 
the transfer of fetal remains from maternity departments to the mortuary. Misidentification of 
patients is a common cause of wrong site surgery [24] and other patient safety incidents [21]. 
Likewise, misidentification of bodies underlay many incidents with well-known risks such as 
same or similar names contributing. Misconduct by staff is generally viewed as an exceptional 
cause of patient safety incidents [25].  This was reflected in our study with only eight incidents 
due to alleged staff misconduct.  
These similarities in causation point to the opportunity for hospitals, their pathologists, and 
their mortuaries to learn from successful solutions in other fields of patient safety. For 
example, standardisation of workflows has been shown to improve outcomes in other settings 
[12, 26-28] and could be applied to the management of bodies arriving in the mortuary. 
Automation of procedures, including a greater use of information technology, also has the 
potential to help prevent errors, for example it could be used to highlight same-name dangers 
automatically and ensure that bodies are linked to associated body parts reliably. 
Another fundamental aspect of safety in all sectors, not just healthcare, is human factors [12]. 
They have been shown to form a vital part in both understanding incidents and in devising 
solutions. For example, we found that working relationships with funeral directors were 
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important in potentially reducing the risk of harmful events. Good cooperation can avoid 
adverse outcomes, shown in willingness of funeral directors to collect bodies at short notice 
following refrigerator failures. On the other hand, we found undue informality, such as 
allowing the unsupervised collection of bodies, can produce mistakes. Informality in the 
management and governance of the mortuary is a human factors element that can be 
detrimental to patient safety. We found that extensive delegation of tasks to mortuary 
workers contributed to poor standards of practice and subsequent errors. A case in point was 
our finding of misidentification errors due to processing several bodies at once or setting 
bodies out for simultaneous post-mortem examinations.  
The findings of our study serve as a warning to those responsible for the management of 
mortuary services of the significant risks inherent in such services and the potentially 
devastating incidents that can occur if these risks are not mitigated and errors allowed to go 
unchecked. It also highlights areas that system improvement efforts can usefully be targeted in 
and approaches that have been shown to be successful in other areas of healthcare.  
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Table legends 
Table 1. Outcome of the incidents by incident type (PM, postmortem examination) N=128 as 
four incidents were not coded with an outcome 
Table 2. Contributory factors identified in incident reports, each incident could have none, one 
or several contributory factors. 
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